



REJECTED VALENTINES.—No. 3.

From a New England Squatter to a conceited Young Lady (Miss——.)

Fair Maiden! do not rave, I prithee,
Nor look as dusky as a smithy,
If I, in honest truth, assure you
That I can never more endure you;
'Tis true you have a certain power
To make a captive for an hour,
Have features not unprepossessing,
Have lips that ask for gentle pressing,
Have eyes which sometimes look delightful,
Yet often have a glance of spiteful,
But oftener still a look so scornful
As made me feel, at first, quite mournful.
Your cheek is soft and smooth and dimpled,
And yet I'm told 'tis often pimpled,
Your nose has such a saucy carriage,
As will, I'm certain, mar your marriage,
Your neck, indeed I can't abuse it,
'Tis round and white, yet kindly use it,
And sometimes o'er it, as a duty,
A kerchief throw to hide its beauty.

You waltz—and few who now pursue it
With such faint swimming grace go through it.
Delirious Polka, too, you whirl in,
And show your ankles in your twirling,
And who indeed can shew a neater,
Finer finish to complete her—
And yet indeed I cannot love you,
You seem to look so much above you,
As if you had no worth or station,
To claim respect and admiration,—
And if some paltry Ensign seeks you,
And for the next quadrille bespeaks you,
You seem to be so much delighted,
As really to be quite near sighted—
Your old acquaintances you pass them,
Or with the almost stranger class them,
And yet there is not in their number,
A piece of such unmeaning lumber,
A thing of such vain outward seeming,
As that poor calf for whom you're scheming.

When you can catch a weasel dozing,
You'll find that tinsell'd calf proposing—
Altho' to lead you to the table,
And fill your plate he may be able,
Yet while you swallow turkey—mustard—
Jelly—trine—fruit—and cinstard,
And of the wine so coyly sipping,
Expect to find him softly tripping—
He does not feel your charming power,
He knows you want the greatest—dower.

Take my advice now, given kindly,
No longer play your cards so blindly,
Seem what you are—be fair and truthful,
While yet you are both fresh and youthful,
And then you may perhaps discover
Some "Model" to become your lover.

1847.

H.

ALL THINGS ARE CHANGING.

All things are changing. Not more mutable
Are the wild winds and waves than is the train
Of human thoughts and feelings—suitable
To peace or sadness—bearing joy or pain.
The varying passions, leagued in quest of gain—
Time's ready tools!—have devastated earth,
Chasing soft Quiet over hill and plain,
Through ages—have borne things of mortal birth
From mirth to misery—from misery to mirth!

Childhood will ope at morn a smiling eye,
And quench ere eve the glowing orb in tears:
Youth spurns the past, nor dreams futurity
Will dim its brightness with the rust of years:
Manhood is rife with change; it hopes, or fears,
Regrets for friendships riven by the faults
Of others, or ourselves, and the cold sneers
Of bitterest foes, at which the spirit halts,
Perchance 'midst gay pursuits, to arm 'gainst foul assaults

Age—which we call the calm that ends life's storm,
The tomb of hopes unfounded, or the goal
Of bright success—though it assumes the form
Of rest, lacks the reality. Each knell
That warns away the spirit hath control
O'er it unlimited, wakening the thought
Of a last hour when weeping ones condole
With those departing—when things Care hath bought
With years of toil—wealth, wisdom, friends, and fame—are nought.

But hush! 'tis Conscience speaks! attend her voice:
"Why dost thou murmur? Oh, it is unjust
To ask variety, and long rejoice
In its possession! Then no longer trust
Its giver, God, because each pleasure's gust
Grows less. Nor canst thou know by Reason's aid
That, hadst thou power to re-form thy dust,
Thou wouldst will aught away which He hath made,
Who at creation's dawn his plan, well pleased, survey'd.

And, though the cities of the earth lie heap'd
Upon the desert, or beneath the wave,
Or in deep caverns—though of those who've steep'd
Their swords in blood, for glory, none could save
Their names from obloquy, or the deep grave,
Oblivion—though sublunary joys,
With all which mortals weakly prize, or crave,
Must pass and perish,—yet kind Death destroys
Their needfulness: we look on Heaven, and deem them toys."

H. N. G.

Supplement to the Acts and Ordinances of the Governor and Council of New South Wales, and Acts of Parliament enacted for and applied to the Colony; with Notes and Index. By THOMAS CALLAGHAN, Esq.

The above is the second supplement which the compiler has presented to the subscribers to his original publication, and

contains all the Acts passed during the last session of the Council. The great utility of Mr. Callaghan's work is already too extensively felt and acknowledged by every one who has had occasion to refer to it, to need that we should do more on the present occasion than say that the same care and arrangement which characterised the first two volumes are continued in this last addition to them.

Sophismes Economiques. Par M. FREDERIC BASTIAT. 12mo. Paris: 1846

[FROM THE EDINBURGH REVIEW.]

M. BASTIAT has, in this well-written volume, collected and exposed the most popular fallacies;—those sophistical arguments which are most frequently employed in defence of protective duties on Imports, and against the freedom of trade. The publication of such a book is of itself a proof that the doctrines of Free-Trade are beginning to make some progress in France; and that the countrymen of Turgot are not all deluded by that spurious patriotism which identifies the exclusion of foreign goods with the promotion of national interests.

Generally, therefore, the advantages which we derive from the possession of colonies may be said to consist in this;—that, in consideration of the responsibility and expense of superintending their government, and defending them against hostile attack, we require them to trade freely with us. They are separate political communities, each with its peculiar, though not sovereign, government—managing its own public revenue and expenditure, levying custom-duties of its own, and maintaining a distinct system, of taxation—but not permitted to use its power so as to impose restrictions and disabilities upon the trade of the mother country.

But the commercial advantages derivable from the possession of colonies have this, and no wider extent. No benefit can accrue to the mother country from attempting to incorporate distant and scattered colonies into her own fiscal system; and to draw a line of commercial privilege between her own colonies and foreign countries. A Zollverein for the colonies of England is an absurdity.

What is the principle of the German Zollverein? A number of adjoining states, having a general similarity of interests, climate, population, and language—some of them single towns, as Frankfort—others being territories not larger than an English county—maintain separate Customs Establishments. Custom-house lines are drawn round each state, so that a traveller may pass through the territories of two or three states, and be subjected to a separate examination and payment of duties in a single day's journey. These states agree to abolish all the internal customs' lines, to levy their custom-duties only upon the external frontier of the confederacy, to pay them into a common treasury, and to divide the fund so formed according to a scale mutually agreed upon. This arrangement is practicable and convenient. Setting aside the rates of duty, (which we are not now considering,) it is beneficial both to the confederated states and to the rest of the world;—to the native consumer, to the merchant, and to the traveller. Each state retains its separate revenue system for other taxes. Its land tax, its excise duties, its stamp and postage duties, are collected by its own officers, and paid directly into its own coffers. But with respect to custom-duties, it belongs to a larger system of states, which levies them for it, and from which it receives its proper share of the common fund.

There is no necessary coincidence between custom-house lines and the frontiers of an independent state. They may be either more or less extensive. Before the measure of Turgot in 1774, the importation of corn from one province of France to another was prohibited. In like manner, the trade between Ireland and Great Britain was not put on the footing of a coasting-trade till the year 1825. There are still internal custom-duties in the British dominions in India. The German League, on the other hand, has extended the circle of its custom-house lines so as to include many independent states. The principle on which this league is founded, is highly beneficial in its operation; and is an advance in civilization, by tending to weaken national distinctions, to multiply the pacific relations of independent states, and to create a community of interests. But, however important and advantageous it may be, it requires, in order to obtain success and permanence, the union of several conditions, which are not of frequent occurrence. 1. The communities must be contiguous to one another, so that the entire confederation may be surrounded by a single custom-house line. 2. The custom-duties must be collected for the common account, be paid into a single fund, and afterwards divided amongst the separate states. 3. There must be such a similarity of circumstances and interests, as to render the continuance of the arrangement probable; and to induce the members to acquiesce, without serious dissatisfaction, in the joint management and collection of the duties, and their subsequent division according to a fixed scale.

The principle of the German customs' league is applicable, for example, to the Italian states; it is applicable to Holland and Belgium, provided these countries could forget their mutual animosity, and combine for a purpose of common advantage. But to a system of communities such as England and her colonies, it is utterly inapplicable. The colonies of England are scattered over every part of the globe. If we made a colonial customs' union, our custom-house lines must reach to the Antipodes. In order to be consistent, we must include Canada, Jamaica, the Cape, Australia, and Hindostan, with the British isles, in one custom-house system. The fundamental conditions for such an arrangement are wanting. These communities, distant from England and from each other, cannot be brought within one external line of duties, nor can the internal lines be abolished. Neither can their duties be levied on a common account; each must continue to maintain its separate and peculiar custom-house. Upon a moment's consideration, it is manifest that a colonial customs' union, so far as the Empire of England is concerned, is an impossibility.

For a similar reason, we cannot accede to the opinion of Mr. McCulloch (with whose views on this subject we generally concur,) that the trade with the colonies should, as far as circumstances will permit, be conducted on the footing of a coasting-trade.* By a coasting-trade, we understand a maritime

* Being integral parts of the empire, the trade with the colonies should, as far as circumstances will permit, be conducted on the footing of a coasting-trade.—*Dict. of Commerce*, Art. "Colonies and Colony Trade."

trade carried on between different parts of the country, which is subject to the same custom-house system. For example, the trade between Edinburgh and London, or between Marseilles and Havre, is a coasting-trade. Now we are unable to understand how the trade between London and Quebec, or Calcutta, or Sydney, can ever be brought into the form of a coasting-trade. With communities so distant and so dissimilar, no identity of economical interests, for fiscal purposes, can be established. Even such an approximation towards a joint fiscal system as was made by the Canada corn act of 1843, shows the inapplicability of the principle. By this act it was attempted to bring the English and the Canadian corn-grower within the pale of a common protection, excluding from it all foreign corn. But one of the main arguments for the protection of British corn was the existence of peculiar burdens on land; which rendered the native producer less able to compete against the foreign corn-grower. Now these burdens were not shared by the Canadian farmer; and therefore the admission of Canadian wheat at a nominal duty, while foreign wheat was subject to a heavy tax on importation, was utterly subversive of this leading argument for the maintenance of the corn-law.*

But, even if a colonial customs' league is impossible for England, if the custom-duties of our vast and scattered empire cannot be centralised into one uniform system, is it not just and politic to give a preference to colonial imports into the United Kingdom? If the mother country must retain a customs' tariff distinct from the tariffs of its colonies, ought it not to establish a discrimination of duties between goods imported from colonies and from foreign countries, in favor of the former? In order to answer this question, we will revert to what has been already said with respect to the commercial advantage derived by a mother country from the possession of colonies;—viz. that it consists, not in assuming the monopoly of the colonial market, but in securing its freedom: not in excluding the rest of the world, but in protecting yourself against exclusion. If the commercial policy of England was managed on this principle, the colonies would not be entitled to ask for compensation in the shape of a monopoly of the home market. They would not be subjected by the mother country to any commercial disadvantage which would call for indemnity. They not only have no substantial interest in a system of isolation, in duties for protecting their native industry; but they ought, if they understood their true interest, to be most grateful to the mother country for saving them from the introduction of this ruinous folly. So long as England avowedly maintained a colonial monopoly for her own benefit—so long as she regulated the trade of the colonists to their detriment and her supposed advantage, the case wore a different complexion. There was a sacrifice on the side of the colony, which might give a claim for a corresponding sacrifice on the side of the mother country. England, however, has now abandoned this restrictive system, and allows the colonists to trade freely without giving her goods the preference. Nevertheless, she retains the discriminating duties against herself, which were intended to serve as a counterpoise to the loss suffered by the colony. She makes a sacrifice as a compensation for an injury which she no longer inflicts. In an excess of devotion, she expiates by an enduring penance a sin which she has ceased to commit.

Let us consider the effect of the system of discrimination in favor of colonial produce, with respect to the interest of the mother country and its consumers, and of the colony and its producers.

When a discriminating duty on colonial produce is in operation, the effect is this. If importations take place regularly under both rates of duty—that is to say, if the article is imported as well from foreign countries as from the colonies—the price is raised to the same amount as if the duty upon all the imports stood at the maximum rate. For example, if coffee is imported at two duties; viz., foreign coffee at 6d. and colonial coffee at 4d. per lb., the price to the English consumer is the same as if there were a uniform duty of 6d. per lb. The revenue loses the difference between the sum received on the colonial imports, and the sum which would have been received if an equal quantity of coffee had been imported under the high duty. The English consumer gains nothing by the discrimination, inasmuch as the price paid in England is regulated by the price at which the coffee subject to the high duty can be sold. The effect of the discrimination is simply to cause a larger quantity of colonial coffee to be imported. But although the quantity of importations at the low duty may be greater than it would be if there was a uniform rate, the profits made by the growers and importers of the colonial article are not raised above the average rate—inasmuch as the trade is open, competition lowers them to the general level. With respect, therefore, to the mother country, a discriminating duty raises the price to the level of the high duty; and deprives the revenue of the difference between the sum paid upon the colonial importations, and the sum which would have been paid if an equal quantity had been imported from foreign countries. With respect to the colony, it merely directs a larger amount of capital into the protected trade; which capital yields, however, only the average rate of profit.

Now, looking at the colonial side of the question, it is to be observed, that in a newly settled country, containing large tracts of unoccupied or half occupied land, there are in general abundant facilities for the profitable employment of capital. The field of enterprise is large, but capital and labour are scarce. In such a territory, capital, if fiscal laws do not create a fictitious motive for a different employment, will be attracted to those investments which are most profitable to the individual, and most advantageous to the colony. It is no advantage to a colony such as Canada, that its capital should be diverted from agriculture or wood cutting. The effect of such an interference with the natural course of improvement, is well described by Mr. Lyell, in the following passage:—"I heard," he says, speaking of Nova Scotia—"frequent discussions on the present state of the timber duties, both here and

* The distinction between a dependency of the crown, and a district of the United Kingdom, with respect to commercial legislation and custom-duties, is well explained by Lord John Russell in his speech on the Canada corn law, 22nd May 1843. It had been stated in debate, that the colonies are integral parts of the Empire, and ought to be governed as an English county. Lord J. Russell observes, that Canada is indeed an integral part of the Empire, but that, commercially speaking, it cannot be governed on the same principles as an English county. Canada, he remarks, does not share our fiscal burdens, or contribute to the common defence of the Empire. Moreover, it imposes import duties upon our manufactures. This is not the case with an English county. Lincolnshire does not impose duties on goods imported from Yorkshire.

in Canada; and great was my surprise to find the majority of the small proprietors, or that class in whose prosperity and success the strength of a new colony consists, regretting that the mother country had legislated so much in their favour. They said that a few large capitalists and shipowners amassed considerable fortunes, (some of them, however, losing them again by over-speculation,) and that the political influence of a few such merchants was naturally greater than that of a host of small farmers, who could never so effectively plead their cause to the government. But, on the other hand, the labourers engaged during the severe winter at high pay, to fell and transport timber to the coast became invariably a drunken and improvident set. Another serious mischief accrued to the colony for this traffic;—as often as the new settlers reached the tracts from which the wood had been removed, they found, instead of a cleared region, ready for cultivation, a dense copsewood or vigorous undergrowth of young trees, far more expensive to deal with than the original forest; and what was worse, all the best kinds of timber, fit for farm-buildings and other uses, had been taken away, having been carefully selected for exportation to Great Britain. So that, while the English are submitting to pay an enhanced price for timber inferior in quality to that of Norway, the majority of the colonists, for whom the sacrifice is made, feel no gratitude for the boon; on the contrary, they complain of a monopoly that enriches a few timber-merchants, at the expense of the more regular and steady progress of agriculture.²⁷

The protection which the parental solicitude of England has afforded to the timber trade of its colony, has therefore proved a barren gift, yielding a return of dissatisfaction rather than of gratitude.

On the other hand, the mother country is necessarily a loser. A discriminating duty can never be advantageous to the country which establishes the discrimination. We can conceive no state of things, in which discriminating duties on colonial produce imported into England can be advantageous to England. At the utmost, they may not be disadvantageous. For example, during the existence of slavery in our colonies, the means of producing sugar, at a moderate price, in our West India islands, may have been so great, and the competition so effectual, that the protection was inoperative; so that the price of sugar in the United Kingdom would perhaps not have been lower, if the competition of the foreign sugar had been let into our market upon equal terms. But cases of this sort are rare. In general the discrimination either enhances the price, or (what is equivalent) causes the consumption of articles of an inferior quality. Of the first case, the present state of the Sugar Duties affords an example. For the sake of our West Indian colonies, and the interests involved in them, we now pay a considerably higher price for sugar, than we should pay if the trade was open indiscriminately, at a moderate duty, with the whole world. Both the consumer and the revenue are losers by the present scale of duties. The result of this system of self-sacrifice, is (as M. Say has remarked) that no countries in Europe buy their sugar at so high a price as those which have sugar colonies! Those countries (as Italy) which have none, obtain their sugar at the lowest cost. Of the forced consumption of articles of inferior quality, the timber of Canada, and the wines of the Cape afford instances. We have imported, and still import, large quantities of inferior deal from Canada, simply because Canada is our colony. Permanent national detriment has resulted from this discrimination of duties. The enormous number of buildings and public works which have been constructed in London, and the manufacturing and populous districts of the country, since the peace, have been deteriorated in value by the use of an inferior timber, peculiarly liable to dry rot. So, in consequence of the lower rate of duty, England annually imports more than 400,000 gallons of the extremely bad wine which is made at the Cape, and which is chiefly used as a menstruum for the wine manufacturer. Little of it appears to be sold avowedly as Cape wine; it is chiefly passed off in an adulterated form, as Spanish or Portuguese.

It may however be said, that although a country would lose by imposing a discrimination on imports from different foreign countries (for example, England, by admitting the wines of Portugal at a lower duty than those of Spain and France);—yet it is the interest of a nation possessing colonies, to give a preference to their imports, not on their account, but in order to secure its own commercial independence. It may be compelled to make war against an independent state, with which it had previously maintained commercial relations; but (unless it should rebel) it can never be at war with its own colony. Such (as we have already seen) was the view with which the discriminating duties on Canada timber were established, (avowedly intended to be only temporary;) and such, too, was the origin of the privilege given to Cape wine. Probably, too, the proposition of Sir Henry Parrell in 1813, to admit North American corn without duty, had a similar foundation; for the dread of commercial dependence was then at its height. That the theory of commercial independence, which has an attractive and patriotic look, should have gained credit during the violent disturbance of commerce produced by the wars of Napoleon—that people should have looked out for some apparently immovable spot in the midst of the earthquake caused by his reckless ambition—was not unnatural; but it was a singular delusion which led our government to suppose that this security was to be found in discriminating duties. If the timber-trade with the Baltic was interrupted by the closing of the Sound, Canada timber would spontaneously, without the aid of duties, be brought into our market. So, if all intercourse with the Continent was to be permanently broken off, (a supposition extravagantly improbable,) a natural demand for the Cape wines would be created in England.

The theory of commercial independence seems to us fitted only for an Utopian state of things; for a golden age of the world, when every country shall, of its own accord, produce all things. So strong are the motives to commercial interchange, and so steady the common interest in its maintenance, that no large nation has, so far as we are aware, been unable, even in time of war, to carry on foreign trade. Athens, indeed, near the time of the Peloponnesian war, was able, out of enmity to the petty neighbouring state of Megara—about as large as an English parish, or a French commune—to cut off its supplies, and to threaten it with starvation.* But it would be utterly

impossible even for a first-rate naval power, to blockade all the ports of a large nation, and intercept all its land communications. A thousand interests would be at work to defeat the prohibition. The failure of Napoleon's Continental System—which was undermined from within and without, by licenses, by smuggling, by corruption, by connivance, by fraud—is a sufficient proof that the most despotic power, and the most unscrupulous use of it, are not able to close the avenues of foreign commerce. However, even if it were possible for a powerful country, in time of war, to interrupt the foreign trade of its enemy, it does not follow that commercial independence, based on a trade with distant colonies, would be of any value. Let us, for example, suppose the most unfavourable state of things with respect to the foreign trade of England; viz. a war with France and the United States at the same time. If, during these hostilities, England could maintain her maritime ascendancy, she could secure the continuance of her foreign trade, either direct or indirect. The belligerent states would not be able to interrupt her commercial intercourse with other powers; nor, indeed, either directly or indirectly, with her own subjects. On the other hand, if England could not maintain her maritime pre-eminence, and keep the seas open to her vessels, she would be unable to carry on her trade with her remote possessions, such as Canada, the West Indies, the Cape, Australia, and Hindostan. A large country, such as France, or an extensive confederacy of contiguous states, as Germany, may, to a considerable extent, render itself independent of foreign trade, by the variety of its native products, and the power of preserving its internal communications during war. But what is the worth of that commercial independence which assumes the power of maintaining, in time of war, an unbroken intercourse with the most distant regions of the globe? Of what avail is it, that we are exempt from the bondage of European timber and wine, if we are to fetch the one from Canada, and the other from the Cape? The *panacea* for the evils of commercial slavery turns out, on examination, to be no remedy at all, but rather an aggravation of the calamity.

But while we are attempting, by a system of discriminating duties, to provide against the interruption of commerce consequent upon war, do we not forget, that by this very system we are sowing the seeds of hostilities, and multiplying the chances of the occurrence of the evil which we seek to counteract? By establishing the differential duties in favour of our colonies, we exclude from our ports the produce of foreign countries, or admit it on less favorable terms. Regulations of this sort, tending to the discouragement of the industry and trade of foreign countries, are naturally considered by them as unjust and unfriendly. Such distinctions, therefore, engender feelings towards us of no amicable nature, and must rank among the causes which lead to war. At all events, a system of exclusion and discrimination, directed against foreign countries, cannot fail to prevent the formation of that community of interest and feeling, which naturally springs from unfettered commercial intercourse, conducted upon equal terms.

It will, however, be said, that even if it should be apparent that colonial protection is detrimental to the mother country, yet it ought to be maintained for the sake of the colony. The colony, it will be argued, is an integral part of the empire; it is a possession of the British crown; its inhabitants are our fellow-subjects; and it is our duty, not less than our policy, to show favour to its interests, and to strengthen its allegiance, by according preferences to its trade.* The parental relation of the mother country to the colony, furnishes, according to this view, a ground why the more powerful state should make sacrifices of a commercial nature, for promoting the interests of the dependent community. This reasoning, however, obviously proceeds in a vicious circle, and returns upon itself. It is first proved, that the possession of colonies is advantageous to a country on account of the encouragement and extension which they give to its trade. The expenses of civil government, and of military and naval protection and the increased chances of war, are admitted to be evils; but it is said that the compensation for them is found in the commercial facilities which the colony affords to the parent state. When, however, it is objected that the mother country is a loser in regard to its trade, and that it sacrifices its commercial interests to the colony; then it is answered that in order to preserve the allegiance of a valuable colony, and to cultivate the affections of our colonial subjects, we must submit to disadvantages by which their trade and industry are benefited. This species of logic reminds us of the reasoning which is sometimes used to justify the common practice of "throwing good money after bad." A person is advised to engage in some speculation on the ground that it will yield him a large profit. He makes the attempt—invests his money in buildings and machinery, and, instead of gaining, finds a large deficit. His impulse is to sell all his stock at the best price he can obtain, to escape from the enterprise as speedily as possible, and thus to avoid all additional loss. But his advisers represent to him the value of his fixed capital, and the large sacrifices which he has made in order to engage in the undertaking; and they therefore urge him to raise more money in order to make a further attempt. He builds in order to gain; but when the enterprise has been attended with loss, he proceeds to spend more money upon an unpromising concern, because he has built expensive works. So we obtain colonies for the sake of their trade; and then make sacrifices in colonial trade in order to retain our colonies.

If the preceding views are correct, it follows that a system of colonial protection, by means of discriminating duties and concealed bounties, is unsound and impolitic; and that the notion of a colonial customs' union is thoroughly impracticable.

Supposing protection to be afforded with respect to an article of colonial produce, not grown in the mother country, (for example, sugar or coffee;) then, as we have shown, the mother country is almost necessarily a loser. No real reciprocity exists, even if the system of excluding foreign produce is adopted on both sides; for one market is larger than the other. The advantages which the monopoly of the market of the mother country offers to the colony, are far greater than those which the monopoly of the colonial market offers to the mother country. At present, however, even this semblance of reciprocity does not exist, so far as this country is

concerned: for England no longer limits her colonies to her own produce. She has abandoned her restrictions on the colonies, though she upholds the privileges to colonial goods by which she suffers. If there is no reciprocity, neither is there any community of interests. Wherever the article is exclusively of colonial growth, the colony and the mother country have avowedly separate interests. The colony sells and the mother country buys. It is the interest of the mother country to buy in the cheapest market, but she is excluded from the cheapest market by her own discriminating duties, and confined to the produce of her own colony.

If the article is produced both in the mother country and the colony, and protecting duties common to the produce of both countries are imposed, (as in the case of Canada corn,) then the protection rests on a different ground. An attempt is made to bring the producers of both countries within the same circle of protection, and to consider them, for this purpose, as members of our community. It is, to a certain extent, an endeavour to create a colonial Zollverein. If, however, anybody will consider the principles of the German Zollverein, and apply them consistently to our Colonial Empire, he will speedily discover the dissimilarity of the cases, and the impossibility of success; he will, we think, soon convince himself that it is necessary to regard the colonies as separate, though not independent communities, for custom-house purposes; and to abandon the idea of bringing them within a system of import duties common to themselves and the mother country. For fiscal purposes the colonies ought to be as foreign countries, with which a perfectly free trade prevails. Each colony has its own tariff, and raises its own revenue of customs, which it applies to the exigencies of its own service. The mother country can watch over these various tariffs; it can prevent the exclusion of its own commodities by prohibitions and discriminating duties, and can secure an uninterrupted free-trade with its colonies. On the other hand, it ought to permit its colonies to trade freely with all the world, and to open its own ports at fair revenue duties to all colonial products; but without giving them an undue preference, detrimental to its own interests, by discriminating duties.

If the attempt to establish a colonial customs' union were made consistently, it would lead to far more extensive consequences than those which our present legislation has sanctioned; and would inflict upon the people of England far more serious privations and losses than the system of colonial protection has hitherto produced. The principle of colonial protection has been applied capriciously and irregularly. There are several important articles which we might obtain from our colonies, but which are not subject to discriminating duties. For example, there is a protection for colonial sugar and coffee, but not for colonial tobacco or cotton. There is, moreover, the utmost variety in the amount of protection afforded; the duties vary from an approach to equality up to ten and twelve times the amount. At times no object seems too small for the microscopic vision of the colonial protector. Thus, there is a protection of 2d. per lb. upon colonial anchovies. Upon oranges there is no discrimination; but colonial marmalade enjoys a protection of 5d. per lb. The importer of colonial tapioca and sago is left by our tariff to bear the full brunt of the foreign competition in these articles; but we have not been regardless of colonial interests in the item of arrow-root, which is protected by a discrimination of 4s. per lb. Our differential duties have in some cases been fixed with a minuteness of adaptation to circumstances, which would, no doubt, command our admiration, if we understood the grounds of the distinction; but which does not at once explain itself to the casual observer. For example, there is no protection for colonial dried apples; but colonial raw apples are favored by a discrimination of 4d. per bushel. The duty on colonial tin-ore is half the duty on foreign tin-ore; but for tin manufactures there is no discrimination. Cattle and meat are, under the tariff of this Session, to be imported without duty; but colonial poultry, alive or dead, still retains over foreign poultry the advantage of a double differential duty. The same measure likewise extends this benefit to colonial "cucumbers preserved in salt." We regret, however, to be unable to discover that fresh cucumbers, or even melons, the produce of our colonies, have any preference in our tariff; certainly "fruit, raw, and not otherwise enumerated," is subject to the same duty of five per cent. *ad valorem*, whether imported from a foreign country or a British possession.

Fortunately, it has never been attempted to apply the principle of colonial protection systematically to our tariff; or to confine the consumption of these islands to the produce of our colonies for all articles which can be grown in them. Almost all the discriminations have been established with a view to the interests of some particular colony. Even in last Session, when Mr. Hutt moved in the House of Commons a resolution for extending the Canadian scale of corn-duties to the Australian colonies, the motion was resisted by Ministers, upon the ground that the concession had been made with reference to the special circumstances of Canada.* It may be added, too, that the rule of the customs' law with respect to manufacturers, destroys to a great extent the principle of excluding foreign produce under a discriminating duty. Thus, American wheat imported into Canada cannot be imported into England as Canadian wheat. But American wheat imported into Canada, and there ground into flour, can be imported into England as Canadian flour, and thus obtain the advantage of the low duty. The truth is, that if the corn-law of 1842 had been maintained, a principle had already been introduced, which, if consistently pursued, ought to have permitted all the corn of Danzig and Odessa to have been ground into flour in Heligoland and Gibraltar, and imported into England at a nominal duty.

It is fortunate for this country that the system of colonial protection has not been driven to its utmost possible limits; and that the consumer in the mother country has not been consistently sacrificed to the colonial producer. But, although the principle has not been applied universally, it has been established in many extensive branches of import, and under the existing protection vested interests have been created which would suffer by a change of law. For example, the wine establishments of the Cape, and the saw-mills of Canada, would, to a great extent, be abandoned if the inequality of duties on which their artificial life depends was removed. And

* See *Aristoph. Acharn.*, 535. The Megarians complained, in the Congress at Sparta, that they had been excluded, not only from the market of Athens, but also from the harbours in the subject islands and territories.—*Thucyd.* i. 67.

* "Is it wise for you to set up (?) this line of distinction between your selves and your fellow-countrymen in Canada?"—Lord Stanley, Speech in Canada Corn-law, 19th May, 1842.

* On the inconsistency of not extending the same principle to other colonies, see Lord Howick's speech in the debate on Mr. Hutt's motion, 5th May, 1845.—*Hansard*, vol. 88, p. 223.