

governor. One of the first acts he was directed to perform upon his assuming the administration, was to convene the assembly, to acknowledge the breach of privilege committed by his predecessor, and to express, on behalf of his sovereign, the condemnation of the breach of privilege. The governor, under those directions, in the presence of the council and the assembly, called before him the registrar of the court of chancery, and erased from its records the proceedings of Mr. Littleton, by which, in his character of chancellor, he had discharged those persons who had been committed by the house of assembly. Another instance occurred in the year 1808, at the commencement of the government of the Duke of Manchester. The assembly claimed, as an essential part of their constitution, the right to examine witnesses at their bar, or before their committees. A gallant officer, Major-General Carmichael, who was then the commander-in-chief of the forces in the island, considered that it was not proper for him to appear before a committee. The Duke of Manchester expressed his concurrence in this view. The house came to a resolution in nearly the same language as that of 1838 :—“ That the refusal of that officer to appear, and the conduct of the governor in sanctioning that refusal, was a breach of the privileges of the house, and that they would proceed to no business until reparation had been afforded them.” The Duke prorogued the assembly, and appealed to the government here. After much discussion, the decision was, that the interference on the part of the Duke, and the refusal on the part of General Carmichael, were not warranted by the principles of the constitution which the people of Jamaica possessed, and the Duke was directed to convene the assembly, and make adequate reparation. He did so : that reparation was made, and it was met in the spirit in which every attempt towards conciliation by the government of this country has been met by the people of Jamaica. It was met more than half way. They called General Carmichael before them to assert their right, but forebore entering into any examination of his conduct.

In 1836, another attempt was made to interfere with one of their rights—with the freedom of debate. The Marquis of Sligo, then the governor, took upon himself to send down a message to the assembly on the subject of a bill which was then pending between the assembly and the council. The assembly expressed their determination in the same language as they had used in 1808—to abstain from any business whatever until reparation had been made to them. This took place on the 2d February, 1836. The Marquis of Sligo persisted in asserting that he had been guilty of no breach of the privileges of the house, and that he was right. He prorogued the assembly. The assembly again met.

He continued to maintain his former assertion. The assembly renewed their resolution. An appeal was at last made to the government, and soon after the Marquis received a despatch from Lord Glenelg, in which he distinctly told him, that he had been guilty of a breach of privilege of the house, and called upon him to make reparation. He did make that reparation frankly: it was as frankly met by the assembly, They at once expressed themselves perfectly satisfied with it, and then proceeded with their functions.

Thus have we traced the history of the constitution of Jamaica from the earliest period down to the year 1836. We have seen it at one time assailed by the power and designs of the ministers of the home government ; while at other times we have seen its own governors—sometimes from bad feeling, and at other times from ignorance or inexperience-making attempts to deprive the assembly of some of those privileges which were essential to the efficient discharge of its legislative functions.

We have seen the assembly always respectfully but firmly standing forward in vindication and support of those rights ; and as often have we seen a victory gained on behalf of their constitution, and those rights and privileges clearly recognized.

It will cease, then, to be a matter of surprise, after the events which have just been recounted, that the people of Jamaica should be keenly alive to the protection of their free constitution, and jealous in viewing measures which derogated from rights which they had so often defended and so long enjoyed ; while the contemplation of the same events will furnish us with the feeling with which we should view the conduct of the assembly, as it will appear in the subsequent part of the narrative.

[To be continued.]

PAST AND PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH NAVY.

IMPRESSED with the vast importance of the inquiry we are now entering upon, and aware of the discussion which the subject has undergone for these three years past, in and out of parliament, we have been at extraordinary pains to ascertain the true state of matters. We cannot help regretting that so much party feeling has been manifested, leading to exaggerated statements on both sides of the case, so as to have rendered questionable the authority of distinguished indivi-

duals, high in the world's esteem, who have been induced by false statements to dilate on the fallen condition of our naval power and resources.

We have already shown, that in so far as the principal and indispensable elements are concerned, our resources are in a satisfactory state ; and it is also generally admitted, that our arsenals are amply supplied with stores and timber. The three points on which the contending parties are at issue, relate to the actual force maintained, the size of our ships of war, and the means we possess for augmenting our fleets, should occasion call for a sudden demonstration of force.

Each and every party, while discussing this subject, invariably revert to past periods of our history ; and from the state of things existing at the commencement of former wars, draw their conclusions as to what may be anticipated under present circumstances. Now, although we cannot perceive that this has much to do with the matter, still experience of the past is esteemed by the majority of mankind as a guide for the future ; and we shall therefore so far chime in with the general feeling, as to treat the subject in the same manner that others have done, and begin at the beginning.

Our object being to put the reader in possession of the truth, unalloyed and unadulterated by factious exaggerations, omissions, or qualifications ; to lay before him a plain statement of all that can be gathered from the most authentic returns to be procured ; we have endeavoured, as much as possible, to throw the great mass of matter examined into tabular form, so as to be more available for reference. Indeed, we consider it incumbent, on the part of every one who wishes to arrive at the truth, to take the precaution of testing what has been, and may be advanced ; because we have discovered in many cases that parties, in making out their case, contrive to draw unfair inferences, by contrasting periods of peace and war, and for the most part, adopt the year 1793, when hostilities had actually commenced, instead of 1792, a year of peace—and in some cases even assign to the latter year the force maintained in the former.

As we purpose tracing the progress of our navy from the commencement of the revolutionary war, it may be necessary to premise a few observations, as to the position of affairs at that period.

The war which ended in 1783—commonly called the American war—and which was succeeded by a peace of ten years' duration, is usually considered as the most disastrous this country was ever engaged in. Our successes at sea, generally speaking, were by no means such as to gratify the public, and our naval fame was only

redeemed by the victory of Rodney, which revived the hopes of the nation, and, by checking the power of France, enabled our ministers to negociate a peace. The great load of taxation, the ill success of our arms in America, and the final loss of those fine colonies, with the apprehension of what might be the consequence of that calamity, reduced the nation to despair; and never was a peace, that enabled the country to recruit its exhausted resources, and reduce the burdens of the people, hailed with greater joy and gratitude. As might be supposed, our naval and military establishments were reduced to a very low point, about seventeen ships of the line, and 19,000 seamen and marines, being the average force maintained, with some exceptions, which shall be mentioned presently. At the close of the American war, in 1783, the following is, if not quite correct, a pretty close approximation to the state of the effective force in the navies of the principal European powers :--

TABLE I.

Description of Vessels in Commission 1st January, 17 83.	England.	France.	Spain.	Holland.
Ships of the Line . . .	105	89	53	32
Ships of fifty guns . . .	13	7	3	0
Frigates	132	103	48	28
Sloops of War	217	86	31	13
Smaller Vessels	88	34	25	6
Total in Commission	455	319	160	79

Owing to the urgent necessity for economy, no steps appear to have been taken in the peace which ensued, to increase the navy of England ; and that of France also seems to have been maintained much in the same state. The total number of English ships of the line, which, in 1780, amounted to 143, was reduced to 141 in 1790, the interval having been employed in building eleven new ships, (at the rate of one per annum,) and in repairing others, so as to replace those broken up, or otherwise disposed of.

We are to recollect, also, that at this period, independent of the navies of Spain and Holland, to say nothing of those of Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, France maintained a fleet little inferior in force to our own ; for having colonies and trade, she possessed considerable

resources of seamen ; and this should be taken into **account** by those who attach value to comparative statements, and measure the power of each country by the extent of its present means, as contrasted with the past.

In 1790, the season of repose which the nation had enjoyed for several years, was disturbed by a dispute with Spain, that had nearly terminated in hostilities. The demonstration of a fleet of nearly forty sail of the line at Spithead, manned and equipped in a few months, had the effect of bringing the court of Spain to reason ; an amicable arrangement was concluded, and the force disbanded. It became necessary to collect it again in the following year, in order to overawe the Russians, (whose ambitious empress Catherine was bent upon subjugating Turkey,) but the demonstration had the desired effect, and the ships were again paid off in the autumn of that year.

The promptitude with which a considerable naval force was prepared on both these occasions, impressed Mr. Pitt with the impolicy of maintaining a large fleet in seasons of peace, on account of the great expense ; and in moving the estimates for the year 1792, although the political horizon was overcast, and most men predicted that war must speedily occur with France, he asked parliament for less than **£2,000,000**, reducing the ships in commission, and men employed, to a lower point than has ever been deemed advisable for half a century before or since. The minister incurred considerable **blame** for diminishing our peace establishments, but more particularly our naval force, at a period when we were likely to be called on to combat for the preservation of our national independence. He defended himself upon the score of economy, having laid down the maxim, that the surest means of succeeding in war, was to husband our resources in peace ; and the event justified the wisdom of his conduct. It has been stated, indeed, that that eminent minister subsequently acknowledged his policy to be wrong, but this idea is so ably confuted by his friend and colleague, Lord **Grenville**, that, to set the question at rest, we transcribe his lordship's words as delivered in Parliament.

“ Their lordships now heard of **£8,000,000** for the navy, the expenditure proposed in 1792, was **£2,000,000**, or **£1,800,000**, and when it was fixed at **£2,000,000**, a reduction was afterwards made in it to the extent of **£100,000**. He had heard, it was said that the great man who was then minister had changed his opinion, and had observed, that in acting to the best of his judgment, in requiring only **£1,800,000** for the army, and **£1,800,000**, or **£2,000,000** for the navy, he thought, on reflection, that he had ill-discharged his duty. It was his fortune to have lived on the most intimate terms of communication and friendship with that

great nation. It was difficult for him, 'at such a distance of time, positively to assert a negative. But he did most positively declare, and he trusted their lordships would do him the justice to believe that he spoke as if he were on oath at their bar, that he had not the smallest' recollection, that he had no belief that Mr. Pitt ever expressed himself otherwise on that subject, than in terms of self-congratulation and conscious satisfaction, that he had, by the most scrupulous economy, at that time, enabled the country to meet that dreadful period of trial, which it had afterwards to encounter. In 1792, Mr. Pitt, in another place, and himself in their lordships' house, referred to the circumstance, as a proof that those who had proposed such a reduction then, did not willingly plunge into war in 1793. Mr. Pitt might have said, that, if he had known in 1792, what was to have happened in 1793, he would not have wished the establishment to be so low; and he said now, that if he could have foreseen the extent to which the madness of the French revolutionists would have gone, and the extent of the folly, not to say treachery, of those who then directed the councils of the king of France, he would have proposed a higher military establishment in 1792. But as to the period between 1783 and 1792, he would say for himself, and undertake to say likewise for Mr. Pitt, that if they had been fully aware of what was to follow, they would not have proposed a higher establishment, for they were convinced that nothing but the lowness of the expenditure at that time, could enable the country to meet the expenses and sacrifices which it was afterwards called on to endure. And if, for the benefit of their country and mankind, we could now be blessed with the presence of that great man, he was fully persuaded that such would be the sentiments that he would express."-*Speech of Lord Grenville on the Peace Establishment, Feb. 14th, 1816.*

As great delusion has been practised upon the public respecting the number of ships, and their size, armament, &c. maintained on the peace establishment of 1792, as compared with the present period, a writer in Blackwood's Magazine having, amidst other misstatements, most disingenuously substituted the force existing in 1793; for the purpose of contrast, we have prepared a list of the ships on the peace establishment, alluded to, their dimensions and stations. The reader, by contrasting this with our existing peace establishment, described in like manner in table 9, at page 379, will perceive how much greater our present force is, not only numerically, but in dimensions-and the superiority in the armament, exhibits a more marked difference still, our ships being now equal to the French in this respect; whereas, at all former periods, the latter had greater weight of metal. To make this more apparent, our rivals have lately reduced their 36-pounders to 30-pounders, and as the French pound is 1-12th more than the English, their shot are now nearly assimilated to the weight of our 32-pounders, with which it will be seen, by reference to table 8, at page 377, our ships are generally armed throughout.

TABLE 2.

A List of His Majesty's Ships of the Line in Commission on the 1st of October, 1792, with their Dimensions and Stations.

Name.	Guns.	Captains.	Length.				Tons.	Built.		How employed.				
			Gun Deck,	Keel,	Breadth.	Depth.		When,	Where.					
			ft.	in.	ft.	in.	ft.	in.						
Duke	98	{ Vice Admiral Lord Hood, Captain John Knight ... }	177	6	145	3	50	0	21	2	1,931	1777	Plymouth	Channel Fleet
St. George ..	98	{ Rear Admiral Philip Cosby } { Captain T. Hicks	177	6	145	2	50	3	21	2	1,950	1785	Portsmouth.	{ Rear- Ad. Cosby, Gd. Ship at Plymouth.
Alfred	74	John Bazely	169	0	138	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	47	2	20	0	1,761	1778	Chatham	Channel Fleet.
Bedford	74	Sir A. S. Hammond	168	6	138	2	46	9	20	0	1,605	1775	Woolwich	Spithead.
Brunswick...	74	Sir Roger Curtis	176	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	145	3	48	9	19	6	1,836	1790	Deptford	Channel Fleet.
Edgar	74	Albemarle Bertie.....	168	0	138	0	46	10	19	9	1,610	1779	Woolwich	Gd. ship, Portsmouth.
Hannibal	74	John Colpoys.....	168	6	138	3	46	10	19	9	1,613	1786	Blackwall	Channel Fleet.
Hector	74	George Montague.....									1,622	1779	Thames	Gd. ship, Portsmouth.
Orion	74	J. T. Duckworth	170	8	140	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	47	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	20	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,646	1787	Thames	Channel Fleet.
Vengeance..	74	Thomas Pasley.....	168	10	138	5	47	0	20	8	1,827	1774	Thames	Gd. ship, Blackstakes.
Lion,	64	The Hon. S. Finch	159	0	159	0	44	8	19	0	1,378	1777	Portsm th.	{ Portsmou th, fitting for China,

In Schomberg's List, which is for January, 1792, the Alcide, 74, Captain Sir A. S. Douglas, and Carnatic, 74, Captain John Ford, appear, but the Lion is omitted : these ships were, according to Steel's List, paid off in the interim, Captain Ford being appointed Commander-in-Chief at Jamaica, and taking his passage in the Europa., 50, Captain G. Gregory.

Having put the opinions of these great statesmen on record, and taken a general view of our position from the termination of the American war up to the year 1792, we shall now place before the reader the most authentic account we have been able to procure of the relative force of European navies at the commencement of the revolutionary war of 1793.

TABLE 3.

Statement of the Naval force of each Empire, Kingdom, or Government in Europe and America, January 1 st, 1793.

STATE	England	France	Spain	Denmark	Sweden	Holland	Russia	Turkey	Portugal	Sicily	Sardinia	Papal States	Tuscany	Genoa	Venice	Malta	Ragusa	Monaco	U. S. of America	
Ships of the Line . . .	153	86	76	33	30	49	60	39	8	4		2	5	4	12		2		} 15	
Frigates	149	78	56	12	11	38	57	21	6	4		2	2	18	7		8	2		
Smaller Vessels	109	82	72	40	60	32	3	140	12		19	18	2	4						
Total	411	246	204	85	101	119	120	200	26	27	32	20	7	4	30	7	10	2	15	

Note.—The **states** of **Russia, Denmark, Holland, Sweden, and Sicily**, and others in the **Mediterranean** had in addition a vast number of **gun-boats**.

A glance at the above table will show that, taken numerically, the force of England, in ships of the line, is considerably less than one-half the total of that possessed by the other maritime states. But these general enumerations are only useful for contrasting. The reader must not suppose that these paper fleets existed in reality. Of the English force, for instance, the late Mr. James, the able and indefatigable author of “The Naval History,” informs us, that over and above twenty-six sail of the line in commission, about sixty were in a state for service, the remainder being either building, or employed as hulks. And that of the 86 sail of the line of French ships, fifty-nine were either equipped, fitting for sea, or in good condition. We may, therefore, assume that the navies of other states contained about the same proportion of serviceable ships as our own.

There is nothing more delusive, or more likely to lead the **historian** or commentator to wrong conclusions, than the mode formerly in use, and still to some extent adopted by some nations, for enumerating their ships of war, which are set down in the official lists without regard to their real condition, excepting such as chance to be in commission, or building. Mr. James, who displayed unwearied industry in his endeavours to **arrive at facts**, complained loudly of the difficulties he encountered, owing to this absurd arrangement. After dissecting the list of our own **navy**, and removing the unserviceable from the serviceable ships, he observes, “as no foreign power pub-

lishes any regular list of their navy,* the British have generally to glean their information from multifarious sources; such as, among others, the hasty and imperfect views of reconnoitering officers, the obscure, and often contradictory statements of prisoners, and the loose paragraphs, and not unfrequently studied misrepresentations, of the enemies' journals, And, after all, the sum total of these dribblets can have but a partial reference; not covering, as it should do, the swarms of brigs, schooners, and armed small-craft, whose depredations on British commerce are nevertheless too important to be slighted. Hence the numbers usually brought forward as objects of comparison between the British and French navies, are wholly inadequate to the purpose, the one being greatly excessive, the other, to about an equal extent deficient."

The reader will perceive, that in treating this subject, on the merits of which so much difference of opinion exists, we have endeavoured to bring under review the statements and conclusions adopted by admitted authorities, rather than intrude any speculations of our own.

TABLE 4.- A Statement of the Sums voted for the Navy Estimates, the Number of Seamen and Marines employed, the Number of Ships maintained in Commission, (distinguishing those of the Line), and the Total Number of Vessels on the List of the British Navy in the following Years.

Year.	Sum Voted.	Seamen and Marines.	Ships of the Line in Commission.	Other Vessels Ditto.	Total Vessels in Commission.	Total number of Vessels on the List of the Navy.	Year.	Sum Voted.	Seamen and Marines.	Ships of the Line in Commission.	Other Vessels Ditto.	Total in Commission.	Total on the List of the Navy.
1791	4,033,684	24,000	46	148	194	432	1816	10,114,045	33,000	33	255	278	776
1792	1,985,482	16,000	13	103	116	475	1817	7,645,422	19,000	14	117	131	654
1793	4,003,984	45,000	29	120	149	411	1818	6,547,809	20,000	13	108	121	628
1794	5,525,331	84,990	91	220	311	457	1819	6,527,781	20,000	13	114	127	622
1795	6,315,523	100,000	101	294	395	510	1820	6,691,345	23,000	14	120	134	612
1796	7,613,552	110,000	115	331	446	592	1821	6,382,785	23,000	12	156	168	607
1797	13,133,673	120,000	123	358	481	633	1822	5,480,325	21,000	12	157	169	603
1798	13,449,388	120,000	125	411	536	696	1823	5,442,540	25,000	12	148	160	580
1799	13,654,013	120,000	138	446	584	722	1824	5,762,893	29,000	13	165	178	603
1800	13,619,079	133,000	130	469	599	757	1825	5,983,126	29,000	14	180	194	603
1801	15,857,037	135,000	121	485	606	771	1826	6,135,004	30,000	14	156	170	603
1802	13,833,570	110,000	124	458	579	781	1827	6,125,850	30,000	15	164	179	603
1803	10,211,378	100,000*	32	210	242	662	1828	5,995,965	30,000	14	175	189	603
1804	12,350,606	100,000	84	356	440	702	1829	5,878,794	29,000	14	160	174	600
1805	15,035,630	120,000	94	459	553	807	1830	5,598,855	29,000	16	164	180	600
1806	18,864,341	120,000	121	513	634	920	1831	5,875,086	32,000	14	148	162	572
1807	17,400,337	130,000	123	571	694	973	1832	4,878,634	32,000	15	151	166	572
1808	18,087,547	130,000	132	563	695	1,032	1833	4,658,134	27,000	13	147	160	574
1809	19,578,467	130,000	141	632	773	1,061	1834	4,478,009	27,000	16	153	169	557
1810	19,829,434	145,000	143	621	764	1,048	1835	4,245,724	26,500	12	150	162	556
1811	20,935,894	145,000	145	582	727	1,019	1836	4,689,051	33,700	17	159	176	556
1812	20,362,149	145,000	142	550	692	978	1837	4,788,761	33,700	24	160	184	555
1813	21,140,011	140,000	143	542	685	1,009	1838	4,811,990	34,165	23	202	221	578
1814	19,312,070	140,000†	138	575	713	1,008	1839	5,197,511	34,165	27	208	233	578
1815	19,032,700	90,000	58	462	520	884	1840	5,854,851	35,165	26	224	250	578

* 50,000 seamen and marines were voted for the first two, 60,000 for the next four, and 100,000 for the last seven-lunar months of this year.

† 140,000 seamen and marines were voted for the first seven, and 90,000 for the last six lunar months of this year.

The average expenditure for the Navy during the twenty-three years' war, commencing 1793 and ending 1815, was £14,500,000.

* Since the date of Mr. James' History, the French and Americans have published official lists, and lately their annual budgets contain a detailed account of the condition of their ships of war.

By the help of the foregoing table, the amount of our naval force, at any intervening time between 1791 and 1840, may be seen at a glance ; and, although the state and condition of the vessels enumerated cannot be known, the number of ships of the line in commission, and the men voted, are pretty sure indicators of the effective force of a navy.

It will be seen with what rapidity the resources of the nation were displayed, that in a single year, from 29 ships of the line in commission, they had increased to 91; whilst at one period of the war they attained to 145, the navy list enumerating more than 1000 vessels. This was produced by two causes:—First, the extraordinary activity displayed in our naval arsenals, when the men were stimulated to greater exertions, by extra pay and increased numbers, added to the very considerable quantity of work performed by contract ; and- Secondly, a process at which our seamen have always displayed a peculiar and exclusive talent, namely, abstracting ships from the enemy's list, and adding them to our own—a mode of arithmetic, whether considered in the nature of subtraction or addition, exceedingly favourable to the winning party, but eminently so when acting in both respects, as the following table, from “Norie's Naval Gazetteer,” will show.

TABLE 5.

General Statement of Ships Captured from the different Hostile Powers, and Ships Destroyed in action, during the War.

	Line, including 54s.		Fifties.		Frigates.		Sloops, & small ves.		Total.	
	Ship.	Guns.	Ship.	Gun.	Ship.	Guns.	Ship.	Gun.	Ship.	Guns.
French	80	6264	7	354	217	7382	408	3997	712	17997
Dutch	29	1794	—	—	40	1336	103	775	172	3905
Spanish	24	1984	—	—	30	1068	142	941	196	3993
Danish	24	1744	—	—	24	848	37	475	85	3067
Russian	1	74	—	—	2	74	1	14	4	162
Turkish	1	64	—	—	7	270	7	96	15	430
American	—	—	—	—	3	139	14	176	17	315
Total	159	11924	7	354	323	11117	7121	6474	1201	29869
British	5	370	2	100	27	856	132	1691	166	3017
Difference in favour } of Great Britain }	154	11554	5	254	296	10261	580	4783	1035	26852

Besides the above, there were lost, by various accidents, of the enemy's ships, 11 of the line, and 14 frigates, with many smaller vessels ; and of British ships, 32 of the line, 7 fifties, 86 frigates, and 230 sloops and small vessels.