Game theory for applied economists / Robert Gibbons
- Bib ID:
- 1074645
- Format:
- Book
- Author:
- Gibbons, Robert, 1958-
- Online Version:
- Table of contents
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- Publisher description
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- Description:
-
- Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1992
- xiii, 267 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
- ISBN:
-
- 0691043086
- 0691003955
- Full contents:
-
- Machine derived contents note: Table of contents for Game theory for applied economists / Robert Gibbons.
- Bibliographic record and links to related information available from the Library of Congress catalog
- Information from electronic data provided by the publisher. May be incomplete or contain other coding.
- 1 Static Games of Complete Information 1 1.1 Basic Theory: Narmal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium 2 1.1.A Normal-Form Representation of Games 2 1.1.B Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies 4 1.1.C Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibriuin 8 1.2 Applications 14 1.2.A Cournot Model of Duopoly 14 1.2.B Bertrand Model of Duopoly 21 1.2.C Final-Offer Arbitration 22 1.2.D The Problem of the Commons 27 1.3 Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibriutn 29 1.3.A Mixed Strategies 29 1.3.B Existence of Nash Equilibrium 33 2 Dynamic Games of Complete Information 55 2.1 Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information 57 2.1.A Theory: Backwards Induction 57 2.1.B Stackelberg Model of Duopoly 61 2.1.C Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm 64 2.1.D Sequential Bargaining 68 2.2 Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information 71 2.2.A Theory: Subgame Perfection 71 2.2.B Bank Runs 73 2.2.C Tariffs and Imperfect International Competition 75 2.2.D Tournaments 79 2.3 Repeated Games 82 2.3.A Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games 82 2.3.B Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games 88 2.3.C Collusion between Cournot Duopolists 102 2.3.D Efficiency Wages 107 2.3.E Time-Consistent Monetary Policy 112 2.4 Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information 115 2.4.A Extensive-Form Representation of Games 115 2.4.B Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibriuin 122 3 Static Games of Incomplete Information 143 3.1 Theory: Static Bayesian Ganies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 144 3.1.A An Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information 144 3.1.B Normal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games 146 3.1.C Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 149 3.2 Applications 152 3.2.A Mixed Strategies Revisited 152 3.2.B An Auction 155 3.2.C A Double Auction 158 3.3 The Revelation Principle 164 4 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information 173 4.1 Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 175 4.2 Signaling Games 183 4.2.A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games 183 4.2.B Job-Market Signaling 190 4.2.C Corporate Investment and Capital Structure 205 4.2.D Monetary Policy 208 4.3 Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 210 4.3.A Cheap-Talk Games 210 4.3.B Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information 218 4.3.C Reputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemnia 224 4.4 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 233 Index 257
- Library of Congress subject headings for this publication: Game theory, Economics, Mathematical, Economics Mathematical models.
- Notes:
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Subject:
- Copyright:
-
In Copyright
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- Published status:
- Published
- Publication date:
- 1992
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