Fix this text
DUN'S GAZETTE
Fix this textFOR NEW SOUTH WALES.
Fix this textVOL. I—No. 20.
Fix this textMONDAY, MAY 21, 1909.
Fix this text(Published Weekly and Daily.)
Fix this textEVOLUTION OF THE LAW RELATING TO
Fix this textBOYCOTTS.
Fix this textSince its inception, the term “boycott” has
Fix this textundergone a marked transformation as well as
Fix this textextension in meaning, resulting in a no less
Fix this textmarked change in the method of treatment of it
Fix this textby any of our Courts.
Fix this textWhen boycotts first made their appearance In
Fix this textthis country in the early eighties, the great in-
Fix this textjury to business done by them immediately
Fix this textbrought up the question of a remeay. A remedy
Fix this textforthwith appeared in the existing law relating
Fix this textto conspiracy. For by that law an agreement by
Fix this texta combination of persons to do some unlawful
Fix this textact, or to effect a lawful object by illegal means,
Fix this texthad long been considered actionable.
Fix this textThe Courts saw that the boycotts, as they
Fix this textthan appeared, were in nearly all cases car-
Fix this textried into effect by the ure of unlawful means,
Fix this textas that phrase was understood in connection
Fix this textwith the law of criminal conspiracy. Actual
Fix this textforce or threats- and intimidation were resorted
Fix this textto in nearly all boycotts. Accordingly, actions
Fix this textfor damages were allowed and injunctions grant-
Fix this texted because of the employment or such means.
Fix this textThe boycotters soon found that tne Comas
Fix this textwould not tolerate a resort to such metnoas and
Fix this textthey accordingly attempted to c-ITectuate their
Fix this textpurposes by what amounted to coercion and in-
Fix this texttimidation. but without a resort to actual force,
Fix this textAnd employing nothing more than veiled threats.
Fix this textThis disguise was, however, readily penetrated,
Fix this textand the Courts continued to grant the same
Fix this textremedies. The result was the appearance of
Fix this textthe boycott in the most recent form, the “peace-
Fix this textable boycott” or the boycott of pure persuasion.
Fix this textNotwithstanding the radical change thereby ef-
Fix this textfected, many of the Courts continued to treat
Fix this textthe boycotts in the same manner as before.
Fix this textThey held, and in fact are holding in many cases
Fix this textto-day, that inasmuch as the person boycotted
Fix this textwas compelled through a fear of injury to his
Fix this textbusiness to accede to the terms of the boycotters,
Fix this textcoercion and intimidation amounting to illegal
Fix this textmeans were employed.
Fix this textOther Courts have held that the mere act of
Fix this textcombining constituted “illegal means,” probably
Fix this texton the grounds stated in the old criminal cases
Fix this textthat the combination was “the gist of the con-
Fix this textspiracy.” It is certainly true that the commis-
Fix this textsion of acts by a combination of persons may
Fix this textchange their character to the extent of making
Fix this textthem more offensive and harder to resist. But
Fix this textit is also true that under modern economic con-
Fix this textditions one person may. because of his situation,
Fix this textbe able to inflict far more loss on his competitors
Fix this textor on the public than any number of persons
Fix this textcombined for that purpose. In neither case is
Fix this textlegal coercion or intimidation necessarily pre-
Fix this textsent. Hence there is no justification for hold-
Fix this texting that the presence of a combination ipso
Fix this textfacto changes the character of what would,
Fix this textwithout the existence of the combination, be un-
Fix this textquestionably lawful acts, and makes them un-
Fix this textlawful. This view, that the means do not be-
Fix this textcome illegal merely because of the existence of
Fix this texta combination, has been adopted by many of
Fix this textour leading Courts.
Fix this textUpon the adoption of the peaceable boycotts,
Fix this textthose Courts which saw that there was nothing
Fix this textinherently unlawful in the means now employed
Fix this textseem to have been in a quandary as to the
Fix this textcourse to follow. The New York Courts stop-
Fix this textped at this apparently logical barrier. In Sin-
Fix this textsheimer v. United Garment Workers the Court
Fix this textrefused to grant an injunction against the dis-
Fix this texttribution of boycotting circulars on ene ground
Fix this textthat there was “no proof of any acts of violence
Fix this textupon the part of the defendants, ox - of injury to
Fix this textproperty, or any threats or intimidation.” An
Fix this textinjunction would, however, be granted by the
Fix this textCourts of that State when unlawful means or
Fix this textthe employment of threats of violence were re-
Fix this textsorted to.
Fix this textThe idea thus expressed that a business is a
Fix this textproperty right, and hence subject to the law’s
Fix this textprotection, has come to be generally accepted,
Fix this textthough not' without meeting opposition, as the
Fix this textdesired basis upon which to ground the new
Fix this textremedy. Henceforth, in the absence or a resort
Fix this textto illegal means, stress might be laid on the
Fix this textother branch of the old definition of conspiracy,
Fix this textnamely, that the end sought to be attained by
Fix this textthe boycotters was unde r certain circumstances
Fix this textillegal.
Fix this textIt is on this ground, the legitimate exercise of
Fix this textcorrelative rights, that the so-called “trade-
Fix this textboycott” have come to be regarded as lawful
Fix this textby many of our Courts. The typical case of
Fix this textthis class is that of a wholesaler or an associa-
Fix this texttion of wholesalers refusing to supply goods to
Fix this texta retail dealer who has refused to abide by the
Fix this textregulation of the former.
Fix this textThe same reason applies for holding the ordin-
Fix this textary labour boycott lawful as exists in the case
Fix this textof a trade boycott, where the former (as was
Fix this textassumed in the case of the latter class') appears
Fix this textin its simplest form; that is, where it consists
Fix this textmerely in the peaceable abstention from busi-
Fix this textness dealings for the purpose of securing some
Fix this textbenefit to the boycotters.
Fix this textIn case those engaging in the boycott do not
Fix this textmerely resort to a “let-alone” policy, but attempt
Fix this textto secure the aid of third persons who have no
Fix this textinterest at stake in effectuating the boycott,
Fix this textshould the same rule apply? The answer
Fix this textshould be in the affirmative. The boycotters, It
Fix this textis true, are asking the aid of third persons In
Fix this textorder to injure the employer in his business.
Fix this textBut so is one dealer in asking the customers of
Fix this texthis rival to transfer their trade to him. The
Fix this textend in view is more remote in one case than In
Fix this textthe other, but, ordinarily, the motive is the
Fix this textsame: a desire to benefit the party making the
Fix this textrequest. Of course if the intent to injure the
Fix this textemployer or rival tradesman were the primary
Fix this textmotive the situation would be different. But,
Fix this textassuming that a legitimate self-interest Is the
Fix this textactuating factor, in neither case would the act
Fix this textappear to be unlawful. This is the attitude that
Fix this textwe find the Courts gradually assuming. New
Fix this textYork, however, is thus far the only State of
Fix this textwhich it can be definitely said that the rule ex-
Fix this textists that a labour boycott for the purpose
Fix this textof benefiting the boycotters, and accompanied by
Fix this textno act unlawful per se, is lawful.
Fix this textWe also find dicta in a number of the other
Fix this textStates likewise to the effect that persuasion
Fix this textconstitutes lawful means, but, unlike New York,
Fix this textholding that to justify a boycott there must he
Fix this textpresent an idea of benefiting the boycotters as
Fix this textthe actuating motive.
Fix this textSome States, on the other hand, still main-
Fix this texttain the ground that “moral intimidation” exists
Fix this textin all cases. The issuance of boycott circulars,
Fix this textwhen accompanied, as in one case, by a state-
Fix this textment that anyone who should disregard the
Fix this textboycotters’ requests would be regarded as “an
Fix this textenemy to organised labour,” would, it Is true,
Fix this textjustify the Courts in taking action. But with-
Fix this textout some such evidence a simple request to the
Fix this textpublic not to trade with a certain merchant be-
Fix this textcause, for instance, of his unfairness to his
Fix this textemployees, and because of their desire to secure
Fix this textbetter terms from him, would not seem sufficient
Fix this textto justify the intervention of the Court.
Fix this textIt has been assumed hitherto that In effecting
Fix this textthe boycott the purpose of the boycotters was
Fix this textto better their condition. But if their real
Fix this textmotive was one of malevolence, out of pure ill-
Fix this textwill to inflict injury by the boycott, would the
Fix this textfact that some incidental benefit would accrue
Fix this textto them shield them from action? By the
Fix this textbest considered cases it would not. This ob-
Fix this textviously involves a denial of the principle of
Fix this textAllen v. Flood, at least as that, case was first
Fix this textinterpreted. Thus as early as 1871, in the case
Fix this textof Walker v. Cronin, it was held mat ir a per-
Fix this textson interfered with the rights of another “from
Fix this textpurely wanton or malicious motives” he would
Fix this textbe liable for any- loss sustained thereby. But
Fix this textif the loss came “as a result of competition, or
Fix this textthe exercise of like rights by others, it would be
Fix this textdamnum absque injuria.”
Fix this textBut in another well-known case, wnere the
Fix this textdefendant company published a notice stating
Fix this textthat it would discharge any of its employees who
Fix this texttraded with the plaintiff as a result of which
Fix this textplaintiff’s business was ruined, the. Court refused
Fix this texthim aniy remedy on the ground that “the pub-
Fix this textlication of the notice was not an unlawful act
Fix this textnor an unlawful threat, and, though done wick-
Fix this text(dly and maliciously, is still not actionable, be-
Fix this textcause it was not an unlawful act, nor (tone in
Fix this textan unlawful manner.” This decision is based
Fix this texton the old idea that a man has an absolute right
Fix this textto carry on his business as he pleases, and m
Fix this textimpose what conditions he pleases in connec i m
Fix this textwith it. This idea, as has already been pointed
Fix this textout, is coming to be supplanted by the new prin-
Fix this textciple that, even in the conduct of his own af-
Fix this textfairs, and in connection with his own property, a
Fix this textperson has no right to injure another without a
Fix this textjustification of self-interest which would be sub-
Fix this textserved thereby.
Fix this textThe law as it at present exists may now be
Fix this textbriefly summed up. (1) The rights connected
Fix this textwith business being only relative, rmy damage
Fix this textdone by one or more persons to the business of
Fix this textanother by the use of the boycott, for the pur-
Fix this textpose of benefiting the person or persons in-
Fix this textflicting the loss, and effected by means that are-
Fix this textnot unlawful per se, should not be held action-
Fix this textable. (2) But the justification which exists
Fix this textwhen the boycott' is effectuated under the cir-
Fix this textcumstances stated disappears when unlawful
Fix this textmeans are employed, and a cause of action
Fix this textthereupon accrues to the person suffering the
Fix this textloss. (3) Where no legitimate interest is be-
Fix this texting subserved, but the boycotters are inspired'
Fix this textprimarily by malice or a desire to Injure the
Fix this textcomplainant, a cause of action also accrues re-
Fix this textgardless of the nature of the means employed.—
Fix this text“Commonwealth Law Review.”
Fix this textINSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS.
Fix this textOn Wednesday, 26th inst., a paper will be read
Fix this textbefore the members of the above institute bjr
Fix this textMr. G. A. Taylor (editor of “Building-”) on
Fix this text“Australia: Her Architectural and Engineering-
Fix this textPossibilities,” illustrated by lantern slides.
Fix this textIt's easy and takes two shakes of a lamb's tail!
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http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-757463945
(1909). Dun's gazette for New South Wales Retrieved August 16, 2025, from http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-757463945
Dun's gazette for New South Wales Sydney: Dun's Gazette, 1909. Web. 16 August 2025 <http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-757463945>
1909, Dun's gazette for New South Wales Dun's Gazette, Sydney viewed 16 August 2025 http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-757463945
{{Citation
|
| title=Dun's gazette for New South Wales.
| year=1909
| section=v. ; 30 cm.
| issue=Vol. 1 No. 20 (May 21, 1909)
| location=Sydney
| publisher=Dun's Gazette
| url=http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-757463945
| id=nla.obj-757463945
| access-date=16 August 2025
| via=Trove
}}
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